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2A Cross Cultural Comparison of Long-Term Supply Relationships
Abstract
This paper challenges the received view that long-term supply relationships are a
typically Japanese feature, embedded and developed in a typically Japanese society
characterized by high levels of trust and cooperation, and for that reason cannot be
established in the typically a-cooperative, competitive and low trust Western world of
the United States and Europe. Our results from the automobile industry show that (i)
suppliers in all three continents are involved in durable relationships, and (ii) that the
governance of these business relationships is by and large the same. The few
differences that remain are interesting. In our interpretation they suggest that perhaps
in the US a ‘third way’ of relationship management has been found. This ‘third way’
combines the advantages of sufficiently durable relations with the advantages of an open
system with a variety of relations that benefits innovation. If our interpretation is correct
the historical situation may have reversed: for the governance of durable relationships
Japanese firms may now learn from U.S. firms.
31. INTRODUCTION
The received view on durable supply relationships is that they are a specifically
Japanese feature, embedded and developed in a typically Japanese society
characterized by high levels of trust, cooperation and interdependence (Dore, 1983;
Hofstede, 1980; Smitka, 1991; Cusumano, 1985; Nishiguchi, 1994; Fruin, 1994;
Dyer, 1997). Moreover, this form of industrial organization supposedly does work in
Japan but not elsewhere in the world. Attempts by Western companies to imitate or
copy Japanese business norms are costly and difficult because the way in which
supply relationships developed in Japan is path-dependent i.e. they are enabled by the
Japanese specific cultural features, politics, regulation, networks and corporate ethics.
Smitka (1991), for example, argues that ‘governance by trust’ is more prevalent in the
Japanese than in the U.S. automobile industry due to the existence of suppliers’
associations in Japan and their absence in the U.S.
Despite the arguments above there is increasing evidence that Western firms
successfully develop sustainable coalitions. In particular in the automobile industry
producers have changed their short-term orientation with their suppliers towards more
commitment, in more durable relationships (Clark, 1989; Sako, 1992; Helper, 1994).
The present study seeks to understand and assess these developments in a new way,
compared to earlier work on the same subject (Heide & John, 1990; Cusumano &
Takeishi, 1991; Deyer & Ouchi, 1993; Sako and Helper, 1998; Kamath & Liker,
1994). The novelty of our contribution is twofold.
First, we take into account a variety of interlocking, and partly circular, causal
relations between composite constructs of relationships. For example, one of the
hypotheses, derived from transaction cost economics (TCE), is that dedicated
investments increase dependence, and hence risk of hold-up. However, they can also
increase one’s unique value for the partner, thus increasing his dependence, which
increases his commitment, which reduces hold-up risk. Further examples will emerge
from our empirical analysis. To test our model we employ LISREL, which is an
appropriate tool to analyze complex and sometimes circular patterns of causation.
4Second, we include issues of ‘competence’ (learning and innovation) next to issues of
‘governance’. Williamson (1999) pleaded for the building of bridges between the
competence and governance perspectives and we aim to contribute to that. More in
particular, our analysis of long-term supply relationships is conducted on an
interdisciplinary basis combining perspectives of governance with learning and
innovation, and social exchange (trust and commitment) into a coherent model. The
model incorporates a set of economic and non-economic motives that drive durable
supply relationships.
We test our model with detailed information on 553, 450 and 226 supply relationships
in the U.S., Japanese and European automobile industry. When comparing the results
for the three regions we find differences that seem small, relative to the received
views on systemic differences between ‘Japanese’ and ‘Western’ contracting. Our
results indicate that in each of the three regions a common, underlying causal
structure of durable relationships exists. Hence, suppliers in all three regions are
involved in durables coalitions and the governance of these business relationships is
by and large the same. This finding challenges the ‘embeddedness’ perspective
according to which durable relationships are an exclusively Japanese phenomenon.
However, from the empirical evidence we identify a few remaining differences
between Japan and the West that may be important. Our interpretation is that they
suggest that in the U.S. perhaps a ‘third way’ has been found (cf. Nooteboom, 1998).
This ‘third way’ of relationship management combines the advantages of sufficiently
durable relations with the advantages of an open system with a variety of relations that
benefits innovation. If our interpretation is correct the historical situation may have
reversed: for the governance of durable relationships Japanese firms may now learn
from U.S. firms.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the theoretical
foundations for this study. Section 3 specifies the focal constructs and hypotheses. In
section 4, we describe our research methodology, while we present our results in
5section 5. We end with a discussion, limitations and further research issues in section
6.
2 THEORY
2.1 Transaction cost economics
Based on Williamson (1985) we employ some of the insights of transaction cost
economics (TCE). More in particular we incorporate the notions of dedicated
investments and the hold-up problem.
The transaction is the basic unit of analysis in TCE and each transaction
shares costs. Furthermore, human nature ‘as we know it’ is characterized by
opportunism (i.e. self-interest seeking with guile) and bounded rationality. TCE
suggests that there are rational economic (i.e. efficiency) reasons for organizing some
transactions this way and other transactions another. The different forms of
governance are due to the different combinations of three principal dimensions for
describing transactions: frequency of exchange, the level of specialized assets, and
uncertainty. Asset specificity is the most important but it only takes on importance in
conjunction with opportunism and bounded rationality, which follows from
uncertainty. Specialized assets are the result of dedicated investments that are
specifically undertaken in support of a particular transaction.
The market is the main governance structure for non-specific transactions of
both occasional and recurrent transactions. However, the incentives for trading will
weaken as transactions become increasingly more specific. Rational firms will not
make dedicated investments unless the resulting transaction-specific assets can be
safeguarded against the hazards of opportunism. Hence, the core insight from TCE is
that dedicated investments create dependence, resulting in a risk of hold-up. Given the
hazards of opportunism, this risk must be governed for which different mechanisms
such as contracts and integration can be applied. To the extent that there is uncertainty
concerning motives and conditions of collaboration, it is difficult to control risk by
closed contingent contracts. High uncertainty will require other forms of bilateral
governance such as hostages or vertical integration to control it. Vertical integration is
6the most powerful mechanism because it gives the customer the best control and
ability to monitor the supplier’s behavior.1 Later we will propose that also from the
perspective of learning and innovation, the relevance of specific assets remains. In
fact, we will argue that new categories of specific investments emerge.
Various scholars have argued that TCE is incomplete concerning innovation and
learning and the role of non-economic, relational factors such as commitment and
trust (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Powel, 1990; Nooteboom, 2002). We consider trust
and commitment to be important, because supposedly these features play a great role
in Japanese contracting and we do not want to exclude them at forehand from the
analysis. Hence, contrary to TCE (Williamson, 1993) we hypothesize that in the
governance of long-term supply relationships trust and loyalty matters.
In our analysis of durable relations in the automobile industry innovation is important.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the automobile industry has gone through a period
of rapid technological, commercial and organizational change. TCE, however, has
little to say about the development of novel competencies. As Williamson (1985, p.
143) himself concluded: “...the study of economic organization in a regime of rapid
innovation poses much more difficult issues than those addressed here”. Later
Williamson (1999, p. 1103) again argued that TCE “…makes only limited contact with
the subject of learning”, and proposed that bridges should be built between the
competence and governance perspectives. The next section addresses this issue.
2.2 Competence theory
While TCE focuses on static efficiency –efficiency is maximized by trading off
production costs, transaction costs and costs of organization, given a certain state of
knowledge, technology and preference– we employ a perspective of dynamic
1 In this paper we neither study contracts (see the arguments in a later section) nor vertical
integration. We analyze durable relationships between two interdependent but autonomous
entities (cf. Fruin, 1992).
7efficiency or innovation, incorporating shifts of knowledge, technology and
preferences.
In many industries the current shift from ‘making’ to ‘buying’ is best
explained on the basis of dynamic efficiency. In order to be at the forefront of
development –and to maintain flexibility of configurations of competencies, for the
sake of innovation– a producer should concentrate on the activities at which he is best
and outsource the other activities as much as strategically possible. Furthermore, in
order to reduce development times of new products and to reduce risks of
maladjustment to customer needs, the supplier should be brought in as a partner in
developing and launching a new product. Ongoing interaction between a customer
and a supplier is a necessary condition in order to share and develop competencies.
By securing interfirm collaboration the resources of a firm can be refined and
refocused. This will enhance knowledge-building and organizational competencies. In
other words, durable relations are a basis for extending inter- and intrafirm
capabilities because internal resources are increasingly connected with those of
another enterprise.
The importance of complementary competencies is underpinned by a theory of
knowledge. This theory suggests that people’s perceptions and interpretations are
dependent on mental frameworks that in turn depend on idiosyncratic experience
(Nooteboom, 2000). Those frameworks constitute absorptive capacity (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990). The need to create a common focus, in order to achieve common
goals, is more fundamental for organizations than the need to reduce transaction costs.
This is the idea of an organization as a ‘sense making system’ (Weick, 1995), a
‘focusing device’ (Nooteboom, 1992, 1999), or an ‘interpretation system’ (Choo,
1998). However, such organizational focus creates a risk of myopia, which needs to be
repaired by employing complementary cognition from appropriate partners. Such
complementary cognition must be at a ‘cognitive distance’ that is sufficiently large to
yield novel insight and sufficiently small to ensure that it is still comprehensible.
Competencies are not off-the-shelf products but are embedded in the heads
and hands of people, in teams, organizational structure and procedures, and in
8organizational culture. They often have a strong tacit dimension. Their development is
path-dependent in the sense that they are contingent upon preceding firm-specific
assets and organizational learning (cf. Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). In the case of tacit
knowledge, ongoing interaction is needed to enable the transfer of knowledge. The
linkage between firms with different complementary perspectives and competencies
requires appropriate absorptive capacity and a shared language for communication.
This takes time to develop, on the basis of interaction, and represents a dedicated
investment. For that reason business relations have to last a sufficiently long time to
make the investment worthwhile.
In sum, from the competence view we take the idea that nowadays (i.e. under
a regime of rapid innovations) inter-firm relations exist primarily for learning and for
competence development. These arise by interaction, in the use of cognitive variety,
which requires (dedicated) investments in mutual understanding.
2.3 Social exchange theory
In line with other scholars that study interfirm relationships we argue that we need to
consider not incidental and unrelated transactions as in transaction cost economics,
but transactions in the setting of an exchange relationship that develops in time
(Granovetter, 1985; Helper, 1987; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Sako, 1992; Gulati,
1995). Not the transaction –as in Williamson’s theory– but the relationship needs to
be the unit of analysis. One reason for this was argued in the previous section: the
need to develop and recoup dedicated investments in the building, exchange,
absorption and utilization of complementary competences.
In addition to that, an important cause as well as a consequence of repeated
interaction among firms is the emergence of commitment, as a basis for trust.
Commitment is an important safeguard for relational continuity. A committed partner
does not immediately exit from the relationship in case of (unforeseen) problems, but
engages in ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1979; Helper, 1987). Trust is a complex concept and
because of space limitations it cannot be fully discussed here (for detailed discussions,
see Gambetta, 1988; Kramer et al., 1996; Nooteboom, 2002).
9Trust and commitment can have both a calculative and an affective basis.
Commitment may result from habitualization (Gulati, 1995; Geyskens et al., 1996).
Also, as a relationship develops, partners begin to know each other better, in the
development of empathy, and can better assess the extent and limits of trustworthiness
(‘knowledge based trust’). Convergence of cognitive frameworks may arise, and this
can lead to mutual identification (‘identification based trust’, cf. Lewicki & Bunker,
1996). Mutual identification means that partners can identify and understand each
other’s goals, weaknesses, and mistakes. They are able to engage in the give and take
of voice. This not necessarily means that they always agree. There may be sharp
disagreements, but those are combined with a willingness to express them and to
discuss them more or less openly, while extending mutual benefit of the doubt. As a
result, conflicts may deepen the relationship rather than breaking it.
Mutual openness is essential to the building of trust (Zand, 1972). An
extensive communication system is necessary to facilitate the rich flow of information
needed for the ‘let’s work things out’ approach of the voice strategy. This information
flow both requires and engenders a high degree of commitment to the relationship.
The development of relation-specific trust also entails a specific investment. Having
gone through it, one will face switching costs in going to another partner and having
to go through it again. In contrast, an exit-based strategy requires low commitment, so
as to maintain the credibility of the threat to leave.
This does not entail that relations should last endlessly. Indeed, relations can
become too durable, with too much mutual identification and trust, yielding rigidities
and lack of the variety that is needed for learning. In our view, relationships should
last sufficiently long to recoup the investments necessary for high added value and
learning by interaction, but not longer than that.
To summarize, from social exchange theory we incorporate the idea that trust




An essential difference between TCE on the one hand and both the competence
perspective and social exchange theory on the other hand is that the former only
studies outcomes, which are supposedly efficient, while the latter look at processes,
which may or may not lead to efficient outcomes. We take the competence perspective
as our basic framework, supported by the constructivist theory of knowledge that we
summarized. Thereby we put value of partners to each other, and perspectives for
competence development, center stage. To this we add the insights of social exchange.
The competency perspective and social exchange theory are consistent in their
process approach. In social exchange theory the development of trust fits well with the
perspective of learning by interaction that we adopt as a basis for the competence
approach. In the development of relations it is in our view crucial that partners invest
in each other to utilize opportunities from complementary competencies, in joint
competence development. This yields mutual dependence, which in turn creates
commitment. These specific investments take on new forms. From the competence
perspective they include investments in mutual understanding. From the social
exchange perspective they include investments in the building of loyalty and trust. In
line with TCE, we grant that there may be a relational risk of hold-up in such
dedicated investments and this risk must be safeguarded.
According to TCE a contract is an important safeguarding mechanism and needs to be
in place whenever dedicated investments are involved. Contracts reduce opportunities
for opportunism. Therefore, TCE suggests studying the role of contracts in situation
like ours that involve dedicated investments. In our view, however, contracts as
safeguards have only limited viability. This derives from Macauley (1963) who
already indicated the limited significance of contracts.
Firms involved in durable relations often use contracts. There will seldom be
no contract at all. However, contracts may have several parts and may serve a variety
of purposes. One purpose is technical i.e. to serve as a mere record to support
memory, like the minutes of a meeting. In that case the content of a contract can be
quite extensive in particular if the interface between business partners is technically
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complex. Another purpose of a contract may be symbolic i.e. as the seal of a
psychological rather than a legal contract, or as a ritual of agreement. This type of
contract tends to be very limited in content. Finally, a contract may indeed have the
purpose intended by transaction cost economics i.e. to safeguard against possible
opportunism.
To find out what the role of a contract is, one cannot simply record whether a
contract is in place. Nor is it sufficient to measure the size of the contract, since
extensive contracts may have the purpose not of safeguarding against opportunism but
as a record for technical coordination. In fact, contracts often lack the detailed
contractual safeguards that transaction cost economics suggest. Such safeguards are
inevitably incomplete, the more so to the extent that there is uncertainty and when
innovation is the purpose of the relationship. It can be very costly to monitor contracts
and to re-specify the content when circumstances change. Finally, contracts can be a
source for mutual distrust when applied strictly to an agreement.
Hence, because of a lack of a relevant measure of contracts we do not include
a hypothesis stating that dedicated investments lead to contracts for safeguarding.
Nevertheless, the principle of safeguarding remains important but we will show that it
can be achieved by other means than contracts.
Our main hypotheses are as follows:
(1) From TCE: a positive effect of dedicated investments on relational risk, and a
negative effect of relational risk on dedicated investments.
(2) From the competence perspective: a positive effect of (potential) value of the
partner, including future perspectives (for competence development), on
dedicated investments, a positive effect of dedicated investments on value to
the partner, and a positive effect of his commitment on his value.
(3) From the social exchange perspective: a positive effect of one’s value to a
partner on his dependence, and of his dependence on his commitment
(loyalty), and a negative effect of his commitment on relational risk.
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The hypotheses are illustrated in figure 1, which is discussed in more detail in the
next section.
FIGURE 1

































3 THE STRUCTURAL MODEL
This section embeds our key constructs and hypotheses in the empirical literature on
interorganizational relationships.
3.1 Constructs
Dedicated investments, as a core concept of transaction cost economics, has been
extensively employed in empirical research on transaction-cost explanations of
vertical integration (e.g. Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Levy, 1984; Anderson, 1985;
John & Weitz, 1988; Anderson & Weitz, 1989) and relational governance (e.g. Dwyer
et al., 1987; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Berger, Noorderhaven, & Nooteboom,
1995). With few exceptions, strong support is found for the expected effect of
dedicated investments. They increase (perceived) relational risk of dependence (hold-
up), and this tends to stimulate organizational integration, which confirms the TCE
part of our hypotheses. Heide & John (1990) found that dedicated investments also
increase the extent of joint action. Further, they find that the supplier’s investments in
dedicated assets increase the expectations of relationship continuity. This is consistent
with both the competence theory and TCE. According to TCE specific investments
yield a need for a relationship to last sufficiently long to recoup the dedicated
investments. According to the competence perspective, dedicated investments are
used to create durable relations for the development of competencies.
Following TCE, one effect of specific investments is switching costs, which yields
dependence. Heide (1994) uses the replaceability of the firm’s existing partner as a
measure of the firm’s dependence and shows that unilateral dependence undermines
opportunities of flexibility. However, he also finds that symmetric and high
dependence promotes opportunities of flexibility. In a similar vein, Buchanan (1992)
finds that high mutual dependence enhances performance. Some studies on
interorganizational exchange also incorporate the concepts of ‘total interdependence’
and ‘interdependence asymmetry’. The former is the sum of both firm’s dependence,
and the latter is the difference in dependence on the two sides of a dyad. Kumar et al.
(1995) show that total interdependence in a channel relationship has a positive effect
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on commitment. Further, they find that greater interdependence asymmetry increases
conflict and decreases commitment. Geyskens et al. (1996) show that greater total
interdependence increases both ‘affective’ and ‘calculative’ commitment. Berger et al.
(1995) found similar effects on supplier’s perceived dependence and supplier’s net
dependence (excess of own dependence over buyer’s dependence). Thus the evidence
suggests that while specific assets yield switching costs –which yields dependence,
which increases relational risk– dependence may also yield commitment, which
reduces relational risk. Therefore, we will test whether specific investments have a
dual effect: a positive effect on relational risk, and an indirect negative effect, through
a positive effect on commitment.
Value, including perspectives for future development, is key in the competence
perspective. It is also another source of dependence. To the extent that a partner yields
more unique value, in competencies that are difficult to imitate, one becomes more
dependent. In fact, the previous indirect negative effect of specific investments on
relational risk is likely to operate through value: specific investments increase the
unique value to the partner, who thereby becomes more committed, which reduces
relational risk. Value is defined as the competencies partners offer each other. Besides
productive efficiency, value includes many more dimensions such as developmental
capacity, value as a source of learning (innovative capabilities), international
presence, and continuity.
The negative effect of dependence on relational risk is supposed to operate through
commitment. Customer’s commitment is defined as the customer’s efforts to maintain
and continue the relationship (cf. Helper, 1987). This brings it close to loyalty, and
hence to trust, interpreted as perceived loyalty. Most empirical studies find strong
support for the expected positive effect of trust on ‘continuance’ commitment (e.g.
Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Geyskens et al. (1996) find that
commitment is greater when total interdependence is higher and that when asymmetry
increases, commitment decreases for the less dependent party and increases for the
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more dependent party. Nooteboom et al. (1997) find confirmation of the expectation
that trust has a negative effect on the perceived probability of relational loss.
Expectations of the future, or the ‘shadow of the future’, has an important impact
(Macneil, 1974; Heide & Miner, 1992). The supplier’s future perspectives is defined
as the supplier’s expected continuation of the relationship with the dedicated
customer of the focal dyad at a given point in time (cf. Parkhe, 1993). Heide & Miner
(1992) find support for the hypothesis that anticipated open-ended future interaction,
which they define as ‘extendedness’, increases the chance of a pattern of cooperative
behavior. Parkhe (1993) also showed that cooperative performance is promoted the
longer the ‘shadow of the future’. Anderson & Weitz (1989) found that expectations
of open-ended interaction between buyers and suppliers have a positive influence on
the supplier’s investments in dedicated assets. This is consistent with the theory and
experiments on repeated games, which show that greater expectations of relational
continuity increase collaboration (Axelrod, 1984; Heide & John, 1990). Hence, future
perspectives are expected to have two effects. First, from a competence perspective,
they make the partner more attractive, so that it becomes more worthwhile to engage
in specific investments. Second, the ‘shadow of the future’ reduces the risk associated
with dedicated investments.
3.2 The Structural Model
In our model we explicitly relate economic with non-economic, relational factors.
Most of the causal relationships between our constructs have been well documented
in the literature. Therefore, we will only briefly discuss our hypotheses with regard to
these associations (see Figure 1).
Concerning the determinants and consequences of dedicated investments we
hypothesize:-
H1A Supplier’s dedicated investments will have a positive effect on supplier’s
dependence.
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H1B Supplier’s future perspectives will have a positive effect on supplier’s
dedicated investments.
H1C Customer’s value to the supplier will have a positive effect on supplier’s
dedicated investments.
We propose several determinants of dedicated investments. Firstly, there must be
future perspectives, i.e. the perspective of future exchange is needed for the
development of competencies to ensure that dedicated assets will be recouped
(Hypothesis 1B). A second determinant comes from the competence perspective,
where value of the partner is the core concept. The customer’s value to the supplier
can be defined as all skills, competencies, and capabilities the customer can offer the
supplier. The more important the customer is to the supplier, the more incentives the
supplier will have to invest in the relationship to make sure that the relationship
continues and it maintains access to the customer’s resources. This yields Hypothesis
1C.
The hypotheses concerning supplier’s value to the customer are as follows:-
H2A Supplier’s dedicated investments will have a positive effect on supplier’s value
to the customer.
H2B Supplier’s value to the customer will have a positive effect on customer’s
dependence.
TCE is certainly correct to argue that dedicated investments create risks of
dependence. However, dedicated investments also create value and this may create
countervailing dependence. When the supplier makes dedicated investments, he will
be better able to perform tasks that are geared to the specific needs of the buyer, and
therefore the supplier’s value to the customer will increase (Hypothesis 2A). An
example of the two-sided effect of dedicated investments, i.e. on supplier dependence
and on its value to the customer, is Toyota’s customer-supplier just-in-time (JIT)
system (Dyer & Ouchi, 1993). For JIT to be in place, customized investments are
necessary to be able to realize organizational input (division of labor, cycle times, and
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staff training), information systems, plants and other flexible manufacturing systems.
These investments are often not readily applicable to other partners. The customized
investments, however, also create value because they reduce complexity and costs by
eliminating inventories and work in progress. This ensures that there are no
unnecessary buffer stocks, distribution facilities or quality inspections. Thus we
hypothesize that value created by the supplier for the customer increases the latter’s
dependence (Hypothesis 2B).
The antecedent and two consequences of customer’s commitment are as follows:-
H3A Customer’s dependence will have a positive effect on customer’s commitment.
H3B Customer’s commitment will have a positive effect on customer’s value to the
supplier.
H3C Customer’s commitment will have a positive effect on supplier’s future
perspectives.
Thus far we have considered risks, safeguards, and the development of competencies.
Next, we turn to customer’s commitment, i.e. the customer’s motivation to continue
the relationship with a supplier. Calculative commitment refers to the customer’s need
to maintain the relationship given the anticipated switching costs associated with
leaving (cf. Geyskens et al., 1996). It is the result of the calculation of costs and
benefits, including an assessment of the investments made in the relationship and the
ability to replace or make up for the foregone investments should the relationship be
terminated. Hence, the greater the customer’s dependence, the greater the customer’s
commitment (Hypothesis 3A). As explained by Helper (1987) in her exit-voice
approach, customer’s commitment refers to all the customer’s efforts to work out
problems with the supplier rather than ending the relationship. For example, a new
supplier may present itself, offering a similar product of equal quality but at a lower
price than the customer’s current supplier. As a response, a committed customer will
offer his current supplier assistance –for example, via specialized technical support
teams– to help the current supplier to lower his price and to match his competitor’s
production performance. Therefore, customer’s commitment will contribute to the
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customer’s value to the supplier (Hypothesis 3B). Finally, we expect the customer’s
commitment to be related to the supplier’s future expectations of the relationship.
Customer’s commitment is an indicator for the supplier that the customer will not end
the relationship in the short run. Therefore, customer’s commitment will increase the
supplier’s future perspectives. This yields Hypothesis 3C.
The hypotheses concerning relational risk are as follows:-
H4A Customer’s commitment will have a negative effect on supplier’s uncertainty
avoidance.
H4B Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance will have a negative effect on supplier’s
dedicated investments.
H4C Supplier’s dependence has a positive effect on supplier’s uncertainty
avoidance.
Customer’s commitment indicates that the customer will not engage in opportunistic
behavior as soon as the opportunity and an incentive for it arises. In other words, he
will engage more in voice than in exit. This increases the willingness of the supplier
to accept dependence (Hypothesis 4A). Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance refers to the
supplier’s inclination or desire to avoid risks, in particular hold-up risk. This risk is
determined by the degree to which one is dependent, as a result of dedicated
investments. Hence, one way of reducing the risk of hold-up is to reduce dedicated
investments and thus reduce dependence. This yields Hypothesis 4B. Suppliers
dependence increases his perceived relational risk, and hence uncertainty avoidance.
This is Hypothesis 4C.
The eleven hypotheses are summarized in Table 1 and together they yield our
structural model of long-term supply relationships (see also Figure 1).
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TABLE 1
Overview of the Hypotheses
No. From Construct Sign To Construct
I Dedicated Investments
H1A Supplier’s dedicated investments + Supplier’s dependence
H1B Supplier’s future perspectives + Supplier’s dedicated investments
H1C Customer’s value to supplier + Supplier’s dedicated investments
II Value of the Partner
H2A Supplier’s dedicated investments + Supplier’s value to the customer
H2B Supplier’s value to the customer + Customer’s dependence
III Commitment
H3A Customer’s dependence + Customer’s commitment
H3B Customer’s commitment + Customer’s value to the supplier
H3C Customer’s commitment + Supplier’s future perspectives
IV Relational Risk
H4A Customer’s commitment – Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance
H4B Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance – Supplier’s dedicated investments
H4C Supplier’s dependence + Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section continues with a discussion of our research methodology, including a
review of the data, the measures and the statistical methods.
4.1 Data collection
The data used to test our structural model of long-term supply relationships are
derived from responses from first-tier component suppliers in the automotive
industries of the U.S., Japan and Europe. For details on the sampling framework and
response rates, see Appendix A.
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The samples are mixed in terms of the suppliers that are involved in relationships with
different lengths of duration. The focus of this paper is to explain the nature of
durable relationships in an international perspective. The mixed population may bias
the results (cf. Dwyer et al., 1987; Moorman et al., 1992; Das & Teng, 2002).
Therefore, we included responses from suppliers that have a relationship older than
three years. It provided us with detailed information on 553, 450 and 226 long-term
supply relationships in the U.S., Japan and Europe respectively.
The data employed in this study have several main advantages. First, they provide
very detailed information about the relationship between a supplier and a customer,
which enables us to design the constructs we are interested in. Second, many items
required the respondent to score on a Likert or a semantic differential type of scale;
i.e. many items refer to the perceptions of respondents. Measuring perceptions is
increasingly acknowledged as being important because it are often perceptions rather
than objective criteria that drive a firm’s strategic decision-making process
(Noorderhaven, 1995). Third, the data allowed us to compare long-term supply
relationships in the U.S., Japan and Europe and by doing so to establish whether the
received view on systemic differences between Japanese and Western subcontracting
still exist. Fourth, the data concerned the automobile industry, which in all three
regions is one of the main industries in terms of its contribution to gross domestic
product and employment. Also, the automobile is a complex product to which supply
relationships are tremendously important. An average car consists of about 15,000
components, all of which have to be produced, delivered and assembled in order to
produce a well-functioning vehicle. As a result, supply does not concern mere
commodities. Collaboration on the basis of dedicated investments and congruent
competencies is highly relevant.
4.2 Estimation Techniques
This study follows the two-step approach of LISREL, separating estimates for the
measurement models from the structural model (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a, 1993b).
Based on the definitions of the constructs we developed multi-item measures for six
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latent constructs i.e. for supplier’s dependence, customer’s dependence, supplier’s
value, customer’s value, customer’s commitment, and supplier’s uncertainty
avoidance. As usual, observed indicators that constitute the items of the survey
measure these latent constructs. The other two constructs, supplier’s dedicated
investments and supplier’s future perspectives, are measured by one item. Appendix B
provides an overview of our constructs and the corresponding items of the survey.
For the factor-analytic measurement of the latent constructs we used LISREL’s
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedure, based on a correlation matrix of
items per construct. The acceptance levels were .30 for the factor-loadings and 2.0 for
the estimated t-values. For the structural model we also used LISREL’s ML estimation
procedure –based on the correlation matrix of the constructs– to obtain the
standardized estimates of the parameter coefficients and the estimated t-values. This
information is used to test our hypotheses. A hypothesis is confirmed if the estimated
path-coefficient is significant and has the hypothesized sign. A t-value larger than
1.28 corresponds to p<.10 (weakly significant); a t-value larger than 1.65 corresponds
to p<.05 (moderately significant) and a t-value larger than 2.33 to p<.01 (strongly
significant). Furthermore, we used LISREL to calculate three of the most common
indicators for the evaluation of the model-fit to the sample data (Boomsma, 1996;
Browne & Cudeck, 1992). These model-fit indicators are the goodness-of-fit (GFI)
index, the adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI) index, and the root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA). For the GFI and AGFI, a value greater than .90 is
considered an indication of good fit. For the RMSEA, a value smaller than .08 is
considered an indication of good fit.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Validation of the Measures
In all three regions the items for a specific latent construct pass the various criteria i.e.
the factor-loadings exceed .30 and the estimates are significant (with t-values >2.0).
Table 2 gives the end results for the validation of the constructs.
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TABLE 2
Factor-Loadings for the Constructs (t-values within parentheses)
No. Construct Item USA Japan Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
01 Supplier's Dependence SD1 .36 (4.25) .32 (2.74) .31 (2.36)
SD2 .41 (6.12) .34 (2.91) .57 (5.24)
SD3 .65 (7.48) .59 (3.86) .67 (5.56)
SD4 .38 (5.83) .39 (3.24) .34 (3.84)
02 Customer's Dependence CD1 .56 (10.18) .43 (5.50) .42 (3.72)
CD2 .56 (10.18) .43 (5.50) .42 (3.72)
03 Supplier's Value
Relative Skills .49 (2.52) .73 (3.46) .32 (2.03)
SV1 .63 (8.71) .70 (6.23) .70 (6.23)
SV2 .78 (9.40) .95 (6.49) .95 (6.49)
SV3 .91 (9.67) .91 (6.49) .91 (6.49)
Technical Competencies .41 (2.32) .48 (2.68) .41 (2.11)
SV4 .43 (4.96) .35 (3.92) .35 (3.92)
SV5 .42 (4.94) .98 (3.12) .98 (3.12)
Innovative Capabilities .57 (2.24) .50 (4.34) .38 (2.09)
SV6 .58 (5.62) .35 (5.39) .35 (5.39)
SV7 .44 (5.19) .58 (7.47) .58 (7.47)
SV8 .67 (5.64) .59 (7.48) .59 (7.48)
04 Customer's Value CV1 .42 (7.86) .39 (3.79) .35 (3.64)
CV2 .39 (7.36) .68 (4.45) .35 (3.71)
CV3 .67 (11.49) .42 (4.16) .55 (4.99)
CV4 .58 (10.64) .44 (5.33) .50 (4.74)
05 Customer's Commitment CC1 .83 (14.69) .47 (6.67) .47 (3.89)
CC2 .48 (9.07) .49 (6.87) .32 (2.94)
CC3 .46 (8.69) .30 (4.56) .35 (3.19)
CC4 .58 (10.96) .50 (6.96) .55 (4.21)
06 Supplier's Uncertainty SUA1 .67 (14.60) .84 (20.64) .73 (11.04)
Avoidance SUA2 .67 (14.60) .84 (20.64) .73 (11.04)
23
A special case is the latent construct ‘supplier’s value’. Eight items were selected
which were expected to measure this construct. The analysis resulted in three factors
which have a clear interpretation: the supplier’s value in terms of his skills (factor 1),
innovative capabilities (factor 2), and technical competencies (factor 3). It is striking
that this outcome applies to all three regions. This empirically confirms the
importance of different dimensions of value in terms of competencies.
Following the satisfactory results for the validation of our variables we added the
scale items to obtain composite measures for the six latent constructs. The other two
constructs are measured by a single item, i.e. ‘supplier’s dedicated investments’ by the
amount of dedicated investments made by the supplier (logarithm scale), and
‘supplier’s future perspectives’ by the number of years the supplier expects the
relationship with the customer to continue. Table 3 presents the averages for the eight
constructs in the three regions (see Appendix C for the summary statistics and the
correlation matrices).
TABLE 3
Mean Values for the Constructs
No Construct U.S. Japan Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 14,10 5,92 16,48
02 Supplier's dependence 10,49 11,34 10,57
03 Customer's dependence 8,09 8,21 8,28
04 Supplier's value to customer 25,02 23,41 25,66
05 Customer's value to the supplier 11,22 12,80 11,13
06 Customer's commitment 10,89 11,49 13,77
07 Supplier's future perspectives 7,93 25,37 17,69
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance 0,44 1,08 0,38
24
5.2 Comparing the Constructs
In the introductionairy section of this paper we argued that much of the literature on
interorganizational exchange suggests that systemic differences between the three
regions exist. Supposedly, this is due to different approaches of supplier relationships,
based on deep cultural and institutional differences. From that perspective, it is
striking that in Table 3 most averages of the constructs for the three regions are quite
close, and the differences that do arise run counter to the expectations. For example,
both supplier’s and customer’s dependence, as well as customer’s commitment have
similar values in the three regions. This belies the idea that in contrast with Japan,
Western companies avoid dependence and commitment in supposedly ad hoc, arms-
length transactions. Hence, the data show that in all three regions suppliers are
involved in durable relations.
Concerning the observed differences, it is firstly striking that in Japan the average
level of dedicated investments is much lower than of the level in the U.S. and Europe
(less than a third). From the perspective of durable ‘Japanese’ buyer-supplier relations
in vertically connected ‘keiretsu’ one would have expected the opposite. The
difference is somewhat misleading because Japanese investments are measured in
Yen (5.92, logarithm), U.S. investments in dollars (14.10, logarithm) and European
investments in a collection of currencies (16.48, logarithm). However, even when we
convert these figures into a common currency the same result appears: on average
Japanese dedicated investments are much lower than in the U.S. and in Europe.
Secondly, Table 3 shows that customer’s commitment in Japan is hardly
higher than in the U.S., and lower than in the Europe. This raises questions
concerning the supposedly more ‘loyal’ relations in Japan. Thirdly, again in contrast
with the received view, supplier’s uncertainty avoidance in the supposedly more
‘loyal’ Japan is not lower than in the U.S. and Europe, but twice as high. Fourthly,
U.S. supplier’s value is the highest of the three regions. Finally, the fact that in Japan
supplier’s future perspectives is clearly highest, followed by Europe, conforms better
with the received view. On average, the Japanese suppliers in our sample expect the
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relationship to continue for about 25 years, the U.S. suppliers 8 years, and the
European suppliers little over 17 years.
Based on these preliminary results we conclude that while perhaps in the past there
might have been great differences in Japanese and Western styles of buyer-supplier
relationships, there has been a certain amount of convergence towards a generic
model of governance. Hence, not only in Japan but also in the West, buyer-supplier
relationships are now characterized –at least in the auto industry– by significant levels
of dedicated investments, mutual dependence, and commitment from the automobile
producer. Apparently, the West has learned from Japan concerning the benefits of
certain durability and mutual dependence in relationships. Having said that, we do see
some differences, and to investigate them further we proceed to the analysis of the
causal relations between the constructs.
5.2 Testing the Structural Model
The estimates for our structural model are reported in Figures 2 (U.S.), 3 (Japan) and
4 (Europe). They are also brought together in Table 4. In all three regions, the values
of GFI and AGFI exceed the minimum level of .90 and the values of RMSEA are less
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FIGURE 3
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FIGURE 4
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TABLE 4
Summary of the Empirical Results (t-values within parentheses)a
Hypothesis U.S. Hyp. Japan Hyp. Europe Hyp.
(t-value) Conf. (t-value) Conf. (t-value) Conf.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I Dedicated Investments
Hypothesis 1A: + .31† yes .34† yes .29† yes
(7.90) (6.21) (3.75)
Hypothesis 1B: + .07* yes .11† yes .03 no
(1.60) (2.77) (0.45)
Hypothesis 1C: + .11† yes -.03 no -.05 no
(2.56) (-.82) (-.52)
II Value of the Partner
Hypothesis 2A: + .27† yes .29† yes .19† yes
(6.68) (6.34) (2.92)
Hypothesis 2B: + .25† yes .15† yes .19† yes
(5.95) (3.33) (2.95)
III Commitment
Hypothesis 3A: + .14† yes .12† yes .12** yes
(3.37) (2.57) (1.83)
Hypothesis 3B: + .35† yes .21† yes .16† yes
(8.78) (4.44) (2.38)
Hypothesis 3C: + .18† yes .09** yes .16† yes
(4.22) (1.96) (2.43)
IV Uncertainty
Hypothesis 4A: - -.06* yes -.06 no -.16† yes
(-1.43) (-1.17) (-2.35)
Hypothesis 4B: - -.22† yes -.52† yes -.51† yes
(-4.86) (-11.57) (-8.25)
Hypothesis 4C: + .15† yes .14** yes .13* yes
(3.19) (2.28) (1.55)
Model Fit
N 553 450 226
GFI .98 .97 .97
AGFI .95 .94 .93
RMSEA .07 .07 .06
a † p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10
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In all regions there is strong support for the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance has
a negative effect on dedicated investments (Hypothesis 4B). One way of reducing the
risk of hold-up is to reduce dedicated investments and thus reduce dependence. This,
of course, is not a new insight. It confirms part of transaction cost theory thinking.
A newer result is that in all three regions supplier’s dedicated investments
indeed have the double effect of increasing supplier’s dependence (Hypothesis 1A)
but also supplier’s value to the customer (Hypothesis 2A). In all three regions these
effects are strongly significant. This confirms our ideas about the double function of
dedicated investments, i.e. they create risks because they increase the supplier’s
switching costs, but they also create value, which creates mutual dependence, which
mitigates risks.
There is strong support in all three regions for the hypothesis that the value of
the supplier increases the dependence of the buyer (Hypothesis 2B). In all three
regions there is also strong support for two of the hypotheses concerning the role of
commitment: customer’s dependence increases commitment (Hypothesis 3A), and this
contributes to customer’s value (Hypothesis 3B) and supplier’s future perspectives
(Hypothesis 3C). However, concerning the hypothesized negative effect of customer
commitment on uncertainty avoidance the evidence is mixed (Hypothesis 4A). It is
weakly confirmed in the U.S., strongly confirmed in Europe, and not confirmed in
Japan. Apparently, the logic of using dedicated investments to make the customer
dependent and thereby to reduce relational risk does not operate in Japan.
Differences between the regions arise in the determinants of dedicated investments.
As noted before, in all three regions there is strong support for the negative effect of
uncertainty avoidance on dedicated investments (Hypothesis 4B). However, the
regions deviate concerning the hypothesized positive effects on dedicated investments
of customer value (Hypothesis 1C) and future perspectives (Hypothesis 1B). These are
both confirmed only in the U.S., the first strongly (Hypothesis 1C: p<.01), and the
second weakly (Hypothesis 1B: p<.10). In Japan the influence of future perspectives is
strongly confirmed, but there is no significant effect of customer’s value. This
indicates that in the U.S. dedicated investments are strongly oriented towards valuable
31
partners, while in Japan they are more oriented towards a continuation of the relation.
In Europe, neither customer value nor future perspectives seem to be an argument for
suppliers to make dedicated investments. We checked whether this lack of effect
might be explained by lack of variation of the two variables. We found that the
coefficient of variation of customer’s value was low in Japan (0.18) relative to the
U.S. (0.29) and Europe (0.25). This may explain the lack of effect in Japan but not the
lack of effect in the Europe. The coefficient of variation for future perspectives was
not less in the Europe (1.69), but, on the contrary, higher than in the US (0.73) and
Japan (1.15).
6 DISCUSSION
In the remainder, we first discuss our key contributions and the implications of our
findings. Than we review our research limitations and provide suggestions for further
research.
6.1 Key Contributions and Implications
This study offers four key contributions. First, our analysis of long-term supply
relationships is conducted on the basis of an interdisciplinary approach. We show that
perspectives concerning governance (transaction cost economics), competencies
(learning and innovation), and social exchange theory can be integrated into a
coherent model. By doing so, we accepted the challenge brought forward by
Williamson (1999) who proposed that in a regime of rapid innovation –which
particularly applies to the automobile industry– studies of organization must include
governance as well as competence perspectives. From the competence view we
incorporate the idea that nowadays inter-firm relations exist primarily for learning and
for the development of competencies. Learning and competence development arise by
interaction, in the use of cognitive variety, which requires dedicated investments in
mutual understanding. From TCE we use the notions of dedicated investments and the
hold-up problem. From social exchange theory we apply the insight that trust is
necessary and feasible, and that it can develop in mutual dependence, in growing
mutual commitment. Apart from theoretical arguments that we present, our
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interdisciplinary approach is also supported by the empirical results of this study. That
is, most of the hypothesized causalities between the constructs are significantly
confirmed in the U.S., Japan and Europe and the model fits the three different datasets
well.
Second, in our structural model we take into account a variety of interlocking,
and partly circular, causal relations between different constructs that composite long-
term supply relationship. We have intended to unravel and structure the web of
economic and relational constructs that in interaction build long-term relationships.
Many empirical studies on interorganizational exchange apply regression techniques
with one dependent and two or more explanatory variables. These studies tend to
ignore interaction effects between constructs. In our opinion, this type of ‘unilateral’
organization research has matured: this research offers explanations for specific
features of interfirm relationships although some overall generalizations can be
established (cf. Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 1998, 1999; Swan, Bowers &
Richardson, 1998). To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is one of the first
that explicitly addresses interaction effects for the study of long-term supply
relationships.
Third, the empirical results challenge the received view that long-term supply
relationships are a typically Japanese feature, embedded and developed in a typically
Japanese society and for that reason cannot be established in the competitive, low-
trust Western worlds of the United States and Europe. The first indication derives
from the comparison of the mean values for the constructs (see Table 3). Most of the
mean values in the three regions are quite close, and the differences that do arise run
counter to the expectations. Based on these results we concluded that while perhaps in
the past there might have been great differences in Japanese and Western style of
subcontracting relationships, there has been a certain amount of convergence towards
a generic model of governance. The second indication for this conclusion derives from
the results for empirical tests of the structural model. Many of our hypotheses are
significantly confirmed in the U.S., Japan and Europe and the model fits the three
datasets well. Hence, we find that the causal structure of long-term supply
relationships is more or less the same in the Triad regions. Apparently, in the West,
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the car industry has learned from Japan concerning the benefits of a collaborative
relationships (provided that in the past systemic differences between the Triad regions
existed, that the ‘Japanese’ model was considered to be superior, and for that reason
has been successfully copied by Western firms).
Fourth, we do find some differences, and those may be significant. They can be
summed up as follows:-
1. In Japan, the level of dedicated investments is lower than in the West (see Table
3), and they are more based on the expected continuity of the relation, than on the
value of the customer.
2. In Japan, customer’s commitment –as a result of dependence that results from
dedicated investments– is not perceived to reduce relational risk.
3. In the U.S., dedicated investments are more oriented towards valuable partners.
4. In the U.S., future perspectives are the smallest among the three regions, but it
does have a weakly significant effect on dedicated investments.
5. In Europe, future perspectives takes an intermediate value and neither customer
value nor future perspectives have a significant effect on dedicated investments.
The U.S. case conforms most to the expectations, confirming all hypotheses. The
evidence indicates that U.S. suppliers involve in cooperative relations, focused on
joint production of added value on the basis of utilizing complementary competencies.
However, there still appears to be a difference in the duration of such cooperative
relations, and in the scope for suppliers to choose from a variety of potential
customers. In our view, this offers advantages. Relations need to be long enough to
recoup dedicated investments and to build up cooperation; to achieve mutual
understanding, trust and joint development. But relations may also be too long,
causing undue rigidity and lack of the variety of relations that is needed for innovation
(cf. Nooteboom, 1998). If it were true that in Japan suppliers are more locked into
parallel, competing vertical industrial structures (keiretsu), with limited choice across
the boundaries of a keiretsu, then the following would follow.
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The expected effect of customer value on dedicated investments follows from the
opportunity for the best suppliers to choose the most attractive customers –and to
engage in more dedicated investments for them– leaving the less attractive customers
to the less attractive suppliers. Those firms have less incentive to tie themselves down
with dedicated investments, and they prefer to maintain an opportunity to switch to a
more attractive customer later. In the Japanese system, with a narrower scope of
choice limited by the boundaries of keiretsu, we would expect the effect of customer
value to be less. Due to the lock-in effect of keiretsu there is less incentive for
suppliers to compete for the most attractive customers by engaging in more dedicated
investments. As a result, the average level of dedicated investments is lower. With a
limited choice of customers, suppliers can only be enticed to engage more in
dedicated investments by offering better conditions in terms of a durable relation,
guaranteed by high commitment. This explanation is confirmed by the fact that in
Japan the coefficient of variation of customer value (0.18) is less than in the U.S.
(0.29). Thus dedicated investments depend only on the expected duration of the
relation, i.e. future perspectives, fed by customer commitment. In Japan, dedicated
investments are not used to reduce relational risk but rather to confirm long-term
commitments inside keiretsu.
Of course what we offer here is only a hypothesis, inferred from the outcomes of this
study. It needs independent testing to further validate our interpretation. This is of
some importance. If the benefits of durable relations can be obtained without making
the relations longer and more rigid than necessary, and maintaining more variety of
relations, this may be better from the perspective of innovation. In other words: in the
US perhaps a ‘third way’ of relationship management may have been found (cf.
Nooteboom, 1998). This ‘third way’ combines the advantages of sufficiently durable
relations with the advantages of a more open system with greater variety of relations.
It incorporates advantages of higher quality with higher dynamic, innovative
efficiency. This is reflected in both the lower U.S. levels of expected duration of
relations and the weaker effect of that expectation on the level of dedicated
investments. If our interpretation is correct it may well be that the historical situation
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has reversed: for the governance of durable relationships Japanese firms may now
learn from the Americans. This would entail that Japanese firms need to break down
their keiretsu system to allow for more variety and lesser durability of vertical
relations.
The results for Europe are less univocally to interpret but nonetheless they offer
valuable information. As in the U.S., customer commitment –created by supplier
value as a result of dedicated investments– is seen to reduce relational risk. They can
neutralize the fact that dedicated investments also increase dependence. However, in
contrast with the U.S., customer value does not have an effect on dedicated
investments. In contrast with Japan, future perspectives does not have an effect either.
In other words, in Europe the management of durable relations takes an intermediate
position between the U.S. and Japan. This generally conforms the expectations.
6.2 Limitations and Further Research
A first limitation of our study is the use of cross-sectional data. It would be an
advantage to test the causal effects in a longitudinal study in which both the
sequencing as well as the timing of effects is studied explicitly. This is interesting
because it would allow seeing whether levels of constructs change over time and how
this effects the causal structure of a relationship. Trust, for example, is expected to
grow gradually, can easily breakdown, but can also be restored again. Commitment
grows very fast when a relationship is initiated, and once it is established it is very
difficult to breakdown: even when relationships are ended strong feelings of loyalty
may continue to exist. In an ideal research setting the perceptions of the same
respondents over time would serve as key input. This really would facilitate the
analysis of durable relationships in space and time. Such longitudinal studies may
apply LISREL (provided that sufficient cases are collected) or other methods e.g. case
studies or computer simulation. In either case, the results from the present study may
serve as point of departure.
A second limitation is that the data were gathered from only one side of the
inter-firm dyad. This precluded any analysis of possible differences in perceptions
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between suppliers and their customers about their long-term relationship. Again
LISREL can be applied but also a limited number of case studies could be helpful to
explore whether differences in perceptions about the relationship exist and how such
possible differences should be incorporated in the model.
A third and final limitation is that the results of this study only apply to the
automobile industry. Without further testing they cannot be generalized to other
industries and/or entire economies. In particular, when we conclude that the U.S. may
have learned from the Japanese way of relationship management, and may
subsequently have improved on them, the question remains whether that is also the
case in other industries. New data collection could benefit from the design and
validation of the questionnaires that are used in this study.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Susan Helper and Mari Sako for granting access to their IMVP databases.
The comments of Hans van Ees and Arjen van Witteloostuijn are gratefully
acknowledged. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.
37
REFERENCES
Anderson, E., 1985. The salesperson as outside agent or employee: a transaction cost
analysis. Journal of Marketing 47, 55-67.
Anderson, E., Weitz, B., 1989. Determinants of continuity in conventional industrial
channel dyads. Marketing Science 8, 310-323.
Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York.
Bradach, J.L., Eccles, R., 1989. Markets versus hierarchies: from ideal types to plural
forms. Annual Review of Sociology 15, 97-118.
Berger, H., Noorderhaven, N.G., Nooteboom, B., 1995. Determinants of supplier
dependence: an empirical study. In Groenewegen, J., Pitelis, C., Sjöstrand, S.E.
(Eds.), On Economic Institutions. Theory and Applications. Edward Elgar,
Aldershot.
Boomsma, A., 1996. The adequateness of covariance structural models: an overview
of measures and indices. Kwantitatieve Methode 52, 7-52.
Browne, M.W., Cudeck, R., 1992. Alternative ways of assessing model fit.
Sociological Methods and Research 21, 230-258.
Buchanan, L., 1992. Vertical trade relationships: the role of dependence and
symmetry in attaining organizational goals. Journal of Marketing Research 29, 65-
75.
Das, T.K., Teng, B., 2002. The dynamics of alliance conditions in the alliance
development process. Journal of Management Studies 39, 725-746.
Choo, C. W., 1998. The Knowing Organization. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Clark, K., 1989. Project scope and project performance: the effect of parts strategy and
supplier involvement on product development. Management Science 35, 1237-
1263.
Coase, R., 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica N.S. 4, 386-405.
Cohen, M.D., Levinthal, D.A., 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 128-52.
Cusumano, M.A., 1985. The Japanese Automobile Industry. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge M.A.
38
Cusumano, M.A., Takeishi, A., 1991. Supplier relations and management: a survey of
Japanese, Japanese-Transplant and US Autoplants. Strategic Management Journal
12, 563-588.
Dore, R., 1987. Taking Japan Seriously. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Dwyer, F.R., Schurr, P.H., Oh, S., 1987. Developing buyer-seller relationships.
Journal of Marketing 51, 11-27.
Dyer, J.H., 1997. Effective interfirm collaboration: how firms minimize transaction
costs and maximize transaction value. Strategic Management Journal 18, 535-
556.
Dyer, J.H., Ouchi, W.G., 1993. Japanese-style partnerships: giving companies a
competitive edge. Sloan Management Review, 51-63.
Gambetta, D. (Ed.), 1988. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Basil
Blackwell, Oxford.
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.E.M., Scheer, L.K., Kumar, N., 1996. The effects of trust
and interdependence on relationship commitment: a trans-atlantic study.
International Journal of Research in Marketing 13, 303-317.
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.E.M., Kumar, N., 1998. Generalizations about trust in
market channel relationships using meta-analysis. International Journal of
Research in Marketing 15, 223-248.
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.E.M., Kumar, N., 1999. A meta-analysis of satisfaction in
marketing channel relationsips. Journal of Marketing Research 36, 223-38.
Granovetter, M., 1985. Economic action and social structure: a theory of
embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91, 481-510.
Gulati, R., 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for
contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal 38, 85-112.
Heide, J.B., 1994. Interorganizational governance in marketing channels. Journal of
Marketing 58, 71-85.
Heide, J.B., John, G., 1990. Alliances in industrial purchasing: the determinants of
joint action in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Marketing Research 27, 24-
36.
39
Heide, J.B., Miner, A.S., 1992. The shadow of the future: effects of anticipated
interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation. Academy of
Management Journal 35, 265-291.
Helper, S., 1987. Supplier relationships and innovation: theory and application to the
U.S. auto industry. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, Harvard.
Helper, S., 1994. Three steps forward, two steps back in the automotive supplier
relations. Technovation 14, 663-640.
Helper, S., Sako, M., 1995. Supplier relations in Japan and the United States: are they
converging? Sloan Management Review 36, 77-97.
Hirschman, A., 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
MA.
Hofstede, G., 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills.
John, G., Weitz, B., 1988. Forward integration into distribution: an empirical test of
transaction cost analysis. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4, 337-
355.
Jong de, G., Nooteboom, B., 2000. The Causal Structure of Long-Term Supply
Relationships. An Empirical Test of a Generalized Transaction Cost Theory.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Jong de, G., Nooteboom, B., Vossen, R.W., 1997. The effects of firm- and relation-
specific characteristics on quality of supplier relationships. In Boorsma, P.B.,
Aarts, K., Steeng, A.E. (Eds.), Public Priority Setting: Rules and Costs. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Jöreskog, K., Sörbom, D., 1993a. LISREL 8: Structural Equation Modeling With the
SIMPLIS Command Language. Scientific Software International, Chicago.
Jöreskog, K., Sörbom, D., 1993b. PRELIS 2: User’s Reference Guide. Scientific
Software International, Chicago.
Joskow, P.L., 1987. Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: empirical
evidence from coal markets. The American Economic Review 77, 168-185.
Kamath, R.R., Liker, J.K., 1994. A second look at Japanese product development.
Harvard Businesss Review, 154-170.
40
Kramer, R.M., Tyler, T.R., 1996. Trust in Organizations Frontier of Theory and
Research. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Kumar, N., Scheer, L.K., Steenkamp, J.E.M., 1995. The effects of perceived
interdependence on dealer attitudes. Journal of Marketing Research 32, 348-356.
Lewicki, R.J., Bunker, B.B., 1996. Developing and maintaining trust in work
relationships. In Kramer, R.M., Tyler, T.R. (Eds.), Trust in Organizations:
Frontiers of Theory and Research. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Levy, D.T., 1984. The transaction cost approach to vertical integration: an empirical
examination. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 438-445.
Lippman, S., Rumelt, R.P., 1982. Uncertain imitability: an analysis of interfirm
differences in efficiency under competition. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 418-
438.
Macauley, S., 1963. Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study.
American Sociological Review 28, 55-67.
Macneil, I.R., 1974. The many futures of contracts. Southern California Law Review
47, 691-816.
Monteverde, K., Teece, D.J., 1982. Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in
the automobile industry. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 206-213.
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., Desphandé, R., 1992. Relationships between providers
and users of marketing research: the dynamics of trust within and between
organizations. Journal of Marketing Research 29, 314-329.
Morgan, R.M., Hunt, S.D., 1994. The commitment-trust theory of relationship
marketing. Journal of Marketing 58, 20-38.
Nishiguchi, T., 1994. Strategic Industrial Sourcing. The Japanese Advantage. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Nooteboom, B., 1992. Towards a dynamic theory of transactions. Journal of
Evolutionary Economics 2, 281-299.
Nooteboom, B., 1996. Trust, opportunism and governance: a process and control
model. Organization Studies 17, 985-1010.
41
Nooteboom, B., 1998. Cost, quality and learning based governance of buyer-supplier
relations. In Colombo, M.G. (Ed.), The Changing Boundaries of the Firm.
Routledge, London.
Nooteboom, B., 1999. Inter-Firm Alliances: Analysis and Design. Routledge,
London.
Nooteboom. B., 2000. Learning and Innovation in Organizations and Economies.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Nooteboom, B., 2002. Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures and Figures.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., Noorderhaven, N.G., 1997. Effects of trust and
governance on relational risk. Academy of Management Journal 40, 308-338.
Noorderhaven, N., 1995. Strategic Decision Making. Addison-Wesley, Wokingham.
Parkhe, A., 1993. Strategic alliance structuring: a game theoretic and transaction cost
examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal 36, 794-
829.
Powel, W.W., 1990. Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization. In
Staw, B., Cummings, L. (Eds.), Research on Organizational Behavior. JAI Press.
Ring, P.S., Van de Ven, A.H., 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review 19, 90-118.
Sako, M., 1992. Prices, Quality, and Trust: Inter-firm Relations in Britain and Japan.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Sako, M., Helper, S., 1998. Determinants of trust in supplier relations: evidence from
the automotive industry in Japan and the United States. Journal of Economics
Behavior & Organization 34, 387-417.
Smitka, M., 1991. Competitive Ties. Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive
Industry. Columbia University Press, New York.
Swan, J.E., Bowers, M.R., Richardson, L.D., 1998. Customer trust in the salesperson:
an integrative review and meta-analysis of the empirical literature. Journal of
Business Research 44, 93-107.
Weick, K.F., 1995. Sensemaking in Organisations. Sage Publications, Thousand
Oaks.
42
Williamson, O.E., 1985. Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York.
Williamson, O.E., 1993. Calculativeness, trust and economic organization. Journal of
Law and Economics 36, 453-486.
Williamson, O.E., 1999. Strategy research: governance and competence perspectives.
Strategic Management Journal 20, 1087-1108.
Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., Roos, D., 1990. The Machine that Changed the World.
Rawson Associates, New York.
Zaheer, A., Venkatraman, N., 1995. Relational governance as an interorganizational
strategy: an empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic
Management Journal 16, 373-392.
Zand, D.E., 1972. Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative Science
Quarterly 17, 229-239.
43
APPENDIX A IMVP Automotive Questionnaires
A.1 Data Collection
The 1993-1994 automotive surveys were part of and financed by the International
Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT,
Cambridge, U.S.). The surveys were mailed to the first-tier suppliers of automobile
producers. As many companies supply their customers with several different types of
products, and their relationships with their customer differ by product, respondents
were asked to answer the survey questions for their most important customer
regarding one product which was typical of their company’s output and with which
they were familiar.
A.2 Sampling Framework
The U.S. survey was mailed to every automotive supplier and automaker division
mentioned in the Elm guide to Automotive Sourcing. This guide lists the major first-
tier suppliers –both domestic and foreign owned– to manufacturers of cars and light
trucks in the United States and Canada. The target respondents were the divisional
directors of marketing at independent firms and the divisional business managers or
directors of strategic planning at car manufacturer components divisions. Since they
commonly take a lead in interfacing with customers, they were deemed the most
knowledgeable informants about customers’ procurement practices. The U.S.
respondents had a wealth of experience, and were thus the single individuals able to
answer all of the questions for the customer/product pair they chose. U.S. respondents
averaged more than 18 years in the automobile industry and more than 11 years in
their companies.
In Japan the survey (in Japanese) was sent out to all members of the Japan Auto Parts
Industries Association (JAPIA), to all automotive suppliers named in Nihon no
Jidosha Buhin Kogyo 1992/1993 (Japanese Automotive Parts Industry, published by
Auto Trade Journal Co. Inc. and JAPIA, Tokoyo, 1992), and to the component
divisions of vehicle manufacturers. The latter publication lists all first-tier suppliers
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(both domestic and foreign-owned) to the eleven manufacturers of cars and trucks in
Japan. In order to maintain consistency with the US sample, the respondents were
asked not to respond with respect to heavy trucks and buses. The target respondent in
Japan was the director of sales and marketing at independent firms. For member
companies of JAPIA, the survey was sent to the main contacts named by JAPIA, many
of whom were either chief executives or marketing directors. JAMA (the Japan Auto
Manufacturers Association) took responsibility to identify the respondents for the
vehicle manufacturer components divisions. The Japanese respondents were generally
well experienced: they had worked for 22 years on average at their company.
The European survey was sent out to about 1,600 major automotive suppliers in
Western Europe. This sample was compiled from several sources, including trade
associations and the major vehicle manufacturers in Europe. The target respondent
was the director of sales and marketing at each firm. Here also, respondents were
asked not to respond with respect to heavy trucks and buses. The respondents had a
wealth of experience: European respondents averaged 16 years in the automobile
industry and 8 years with their companies.
A.3 Response Rates
The U.S. and Japanese responses were far above the norm for business surveys. It was
55 percent in North America, 30 percent in Japan (45 percent among JAPIA
members). The response rate for Europe was 16 percent: 25 percent among suppliers
from the United Kingdom, 24 percent from Germany, 9 percent from France, and 10
percent from Italy. These response rates are after taking into account those firms,
which were unreachable (mail sent to them was returned undelivered), and those,
which were not eligible to participate in the survey (they were not first-tier suppliers,
or they specialized in supplying for heavy trucks and buses).
The European response rate may seem somewhat low. A low response rate is
particularly worrisome when one intends to analyze levels of variables. The main aim
of this study, however, is to identify causal relationships between variables, and to
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study this with LISREL. The issue than is more indirect i.e. sufficient cases is needed
to obtain robust LISREL estimates. As a rule of thumb, 20 observations for each
(latent) variable included in the (structural) model are needed. Hence, for our
structural model with eight variables the European sample is sufficiently large
because the number of cases exceeds the minimum number of 160 observations.
With respect to the U.S. and Japan, non-response bias is assessed in several ways.
First, the characteristics of those who returned the survey were compared to those of
the entire population. On the characteristics of size and location no significant
differences are found. Second, the survey respondents were divided into two groups
based on response data. The hypothesis is that those who responded only after the
second follow-up mailing might have more in common with those who did not
respond at all than those who responded early. This test shows no significant
differences for early and late respondents on any of the measures reported in
Appendix B. The statistical significance in both cases is judged using a one per cent
cut-off point. With respect to Europe, a non-response analysis is not available and
hence, a non-response bias may exist.
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APPENDIX B Explanation of the constructs, items and scales
1 Supplier’s dedicated investments SUPINV
Please estimate the total amount of your business unit’s investment in equipment to
make this product for this customer over the last four years. (Scale: the logarithm of
the amount of investments).
2 Supplier’s dependence SUPDEP
SD1 If you were to stop getting these orders from this customer, approximately how
much of your investment for this product in plant, equipment, and training
would you be unlikely to find alternative uses for and have to write off? (A 1-5
scale with 1 = 10% or less; 5 = 90-100%).
SD2 Please estimate the technical complexity involved in manufacturing the product
in 1992. (A 1-5 scale with 1 = fairly simple; 5 = highly complex).
SD3 Please check the appropriate range for the average piece price of the product in
1992. (A 1-5 scale with 1 = <$1; 5 = > $100).
SD4 Does your business unit have any of the following? (A 1-5 scale with one point
for each of the checked opportunities). A marketing office near your customer; a
design office near your customer; a facility near your customer to consolidate
shipments of your parts for ‘Just-in-Time’ (JIT) delivery; an engineers resident at
your customer’s facility.
3 Customer’s Dependence CUSDEP
CD1 Please estimate the number of months it would take your customer to replace
your business unit with another supplier. Consider the time required to locate,
qualify, train, make investments, test, and develop a working relationship with
another firm. Please exclude legal considerations such as the existence of long-
term contracts. (A 1-6 scale with 1 = 0; 6 = > 48).
CD2 What percent of your business unit’s sales ends up as original equipment for cars
or light trucks? (A 1-6 scale with 1 = 0-10; 6 = 81-100).
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4 Supplier’s value to the customer SUPVAL
SV1 For design engineering. Currently, how would you rate your business unit’s skills
at making modifications to products or processes? Please compare yourself to
other firms in your industry throughout the world. (A 1-5 Likert scale with 1 =
significantly below average; 5 = significantly above average).
SV2 For making incremental process improvements. Currently, how would you rate
your business unit’s skills at making modifications to products or processes?
Please compare yourself to other firms in your industry throughout the world. (A
1-5 Likert scale with 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above
average).
SV3 For implementing entirely new processes. Currently, how would you rate your
business unit’s skills at making modifications to products or processes? Please
compare yourself to other firms in your industry throughout the world. (A 1-5
Likert scale with 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above
average).
SV4 Of the metal cutting machines currently in use at the plant that makes this
product, about what percent are CNC? ( A 1-5 scale with 1 = 0%; 5 = 76-100%).
SV5 About how many robots (programmable machines with at least three axes of
movement) are in use at the plant? (A 1-5 scale with 1 = 0; 5 = >10).
SV6 Approximately what percent of the contacts with your customer regarding this
product were for ‘your business unit providing technical assistance to customer’?
(A 1-5 scale with 1 = 0-19; 5 = 80-100).
SV7 Which range best describes your business unit’s R&D as a percent of sales? (A
1-5 scale with 1 = 0%; 5 = >4%).
SV8 Please check the descriptions which apply to the product development process
for your company’s product. (A 1-5 scale with 1 = customer took entire
responsibility; 5 = your business unit took entire responsibility).
5 Customer’s value to the supplier CUSVAL
CV1 Over the last four years, what sorts of technical assistance have you received
from your customer? (A 1-5 scale with one point for each checked opportunity).
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Provided personnel who visited your site to aid in implementing improved
procedures (for zero or a nominal charge; or for a fee). Arranged for training of
your personnel at their site (for zero or a nominal charge; or for a fee). Provided
personnel who worked two weeks or more on your shop floor to improve your
processes (for zero or a nominal charge; or for a fee).
CV2 Approximately what percent of the contacts with your customer regarding this
product were for ‘customer providing technical assistance to your business unit’?
(A 1-5 scale with 1 = 0; 5 = 31-100).
CV3 The advice our customer gives us is not always helpful. (A 1-5 Likert scale with
1 = strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree).
CV4 In dealing with this customer, we have learned much that will help us with other
customers. (A 1-5 Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
6 Customer’s commitment CUSCOM
CC1 How would your customer react if one of your competitors offered a lower price
for a product of equal quality? (A 1-5 scale with 1 = switch to competitor as
soon as technical feasible; 5 = help you match your competitors’ efforts).
CC2 How would your customer react if your material suppliers raised their prices? (A
1-5 scale with 1 = reduce your business unit’s market share or switch to another
supplier at end of contract; 5 = provide significant help for your business unit to
reduce costs).
CC3 Suppose your business unit had an idea that would allow you to reduce your
costs, but would require your customer to make a slight modification in its
procedures. How would your customer react? (A 1-5 scale with 1 = customer
does not welcome suggestions that would require modifications in its
procedures; 5 = customer would eagerly solicits such suggestions).
CC4 We can rely on our customer to help us in ways not required by our agreement
with them. (A 1-5 Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
7 Supplier’s future perspectives SUPFUT
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For how long do you think there is a high probability that your business unit will be
supplying this or a similar item to your customer (in years)? (Scale: the number of
years).
8 Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance SUPUNC
SUA1 If our customer had given us less assurance of continued business for this
product, we would definitely have invested less in plant, equipment, and
training which could be used to serve only this customer. (A 1-5 Likert scale
with 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
SUA2 If our customer had given us less assurance of continued business for this
product, we would definitely have invested less in plant, equipment, and
training which could be used to serve either this customer or other customers.
(A 1-5 Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
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APPENDIX C Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrices
Table C.1
Summary Statistics (standard deviations within parentheses)
No. Construct U.S. Japan Europe
mean min. max. mean min. max. mean min. max.
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 14,10 0,00 20,72 5,92 0,00 11,51 16,48 6,91 23,72
(3,62) (2,03) (3,26)
02 Supplier's dependence 10,49 4,00 17,00 11,34 5,00 18,00 10,57 5,00 18,00
(2,54) (2,46) (2,65)
03 Customer's dependence 8,09 2,00 12,00 8,21 2,00 12,00 8,28 3,00 12,00
(2,08) (1,91) (1,79)
04 Supplier's value to customer 25,02 12,00 39,00 23,41 11,00 36,00 25,66 13,00 40,00
(4,77) (4,09) (4,16)
05 Customer's value to the supplier 11,22 4,00 19,00 12,80 5,00 19,00 11,13 4,00 17,00
(3,22) (2,26) (2,76)
06 Customer's commitment 10,89 4,00 18,00 11,49 5,00 20,00 13,77 4,00 20,00
(2,94) (2,25) (2,84)
07 Supplier's future perspectives 7,93 0,00 50,00 25,37 0,00 100,00 17,69 0,00 100,00
(5,77) (29,09) (29,84)




Correlation Matrix U.S. (below diagonal) and Japan (above diagonal)
TABLE C.3
Correlation Matrix Europe
No Construct 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 1,00 0,28 0,20 0,29 -0,03 -0,01 -0,15 -0,49
02 Supplier's dependence 0,35 1,00 0,34 0,21 0,11 0,05 0,09 -0,05
03 Customer's dependence 0,20 0,40 1,00 0,21 0,06 0,13 0,12 -0,02
04 Supplier's value to the customer 0,27 0,34 0,25 1,00 -0,03 0,01 0,17 -0,23
05 Customer's value to the supplier 0,11 0,10 0,13 0,10 1,00 0,20 0,09 0,01
06 Customer's commitment 0,01 0,04 0,15 0,06 0,35 1,00 0,09 -0,06
07 Supplier's future perspectives 0,08 0,10 0,15 0,08 0,07 0,18 1,00 -0,08
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance -0,17 0,08 0,03 -0,02 0,03 -0,06 -0,02 1,00
No Construct 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 1,00
02 Supplier's dependence 0,23 1,00
03 Customer's dependence 0,11 0,19 1,00
04 Supplier's value to the customer 0,19 0,25 0,19 1,00
05 Customer's value to the supplier -0,05 -0,01 0,13 0.01 1,00
06 Customer's commitment -0,12 0,09 0,12 -0,15 0,16 1,00
07 Supplier's future perspectives 0,01 0,06 0,06 0,04 0,04 0,16 1,00
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance -0,48 -0,01 0,01 -0,07 0,01 -0,17 0,02 1,00
